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COMMENTS
appeal stated that "the owner of the soil on which a public road
shall pass may resume and take possession of the same 'when-
ever said road shall have been abandoned by the public, or shall
have been transferred elsewhere with the consent of the owner
and with that of the competent authority.' "63 The court based
its decision on a portion of section 3368 of the Revised Statutes
of 1870, which was not carried into the Revised Statutes of
1950. Although there is no statutory provision today which au-
thorizes implied abandonment, the courts, as with implied dedi-
cation, continue to recognize this method of abandonment.
Termination of servitude of passage by ten years' non-use. A
second method by which the public may lose a servitude of pas-
sage or way is through liberative prescription of ten years, as
expressed in article 789 of the Civil Code.6 4 Although the Louisi-
ana Constitution states that "prescription shall not run against
the State in any civil matter,"65 it was declared in New Orleans
v. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co.66 that this constitutional provision
does not prevent prescription from running against a parish or
municipality where the subject involved is alienable. This prin-
ciple is well established in the jurisprudence. Thus, in Baret v.
Louisiana Highway Commission 7 the police jury of Calcasieu
Parish had obtained a servitude on additional ten-foot strips of
land on the sides of an old road. The court held that non-usage
of the strips of land for more than ten years extinguished the
right to their use. Similarly, in Jouett v. Keeney,65 the grantee
of a servitude of passage was ruled to have lost the rights and
privileges over the strip by non-usage during the prescribed
period.
Thomas D. Hardeman
The Degree of Cruelty Necessary to Justify Separation
from Bed and Board in Louisiana
Article 138(3) of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that if
one spouse is guilty of such cruel treatment toward the other as
to "render their living together insupportable" the other spouse
63. Id. at 362.
64. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 789 ,(1870) : "A right to servitude is extinguished by
the non-usage of the same during ten years."
65. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 16.
66. 135 La. 828,-66 So. 237 (1914).
67. 178 La. 454, 151 So. 768 (1933).
68. 17 La. App. 323, 136 So. 175 (La. App. 1931).
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has the right to demand a separation from bed and board.' Al-
though many acts may be considered cruel, the court ruling on
the separation must decide whether the cruel treatment is "of
such a nature as to render their living together insupportable."
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the factors underlying
the codal requirement and to group and classify the decisions of
the Louisiana Supreme Court dealing with cruelty. Special con-
sideration will be given to determining the extent the court has
actually applied insupportability as a requisite.
The term insupportability is probably incapable of exact
definition. To the writer it seems to connote a relationship be-
tween spouses which is unbearable and which renders harmoni-
ous cohabitation impossible. Despite difficulty in definition, the
term must nevertheless be accorded some uniform meaning by
the court, as it is the only basis for determining whether the par-
ticular conduct involved warrants the separation of the parties.
Except for this requirement of insupportability, even if uncer-
tain, there is nothing else in the Code article to prevent the
extension of "cruelty" to almost any insult. Without the re-
quirement, the Code provision would be a means of facilitating
separation rather than a mode of limiting separation to good
cause only.
Underlying Factors to Consider
In determining whether a particular act constitutes such
cruelty as to render living together insupportable, the court has
considered a number of underlying factors surrounding the mar-
riage. In one case the court took note of the frailty of man's
nature, the just authority of the husband, and the respect which
is due the wife.2 The character, education, habits, and senti-
ments of the spouses have also been considered.3 Length of mar-
riage was undoubtedly the principal factor in a case involving
the use of vile epithets by the husband, 4 inasmuch as the court
concluded: "Having managed to live together these many years,
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 138(3) (1870) - "Separation from bed and board may
be claimed reciprocally for the following causes: ... 3. On account of ... excesses,
cruel treatment, or outrages of one of [the married personsi towards the other,
if .. . such ill treatment is of such a nature as to render their living together
insupportable."
2. Tourne v. Tourne, 9 La. 452 (1836).
3. See Schlater v. LeBlanc, 121 La. 919, 46 So. 921 (1908) ; Terrell v. Boar-
man, 34 La. Ann. 301 (1882) ; Lauber v. Mast, 15 La. Ann. 593 (1860).
4. Smith v. Smith, 116 La. 1005, 41 So. 238 (1906).
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they should stay together in the evening of life, which they can
do by the exercise of a little patience and forbearance. They
have lived together nearly half a century." 5 In still another de-
cision, childishness and impetuosity were the considerations
which prevented separation.0
The social class of which the couple is a member is another
important factor, and as culture and refinement increase, the
acts need not be as violent to cause living together to be insup-
portable.7 Provocation for the action and degree of violence are
other important elements.8 Furthermore, the complainant must
be comparatively free from wrong and not equally responsible
for the domestic difficulty.
Although it is important to know that the circumstances sur-
rounding the marriage are considered in determining the ques-
tion of separation, it is obvious that the acts of conduct which
give rise to the suit for separation play perhaps the paramount
role in the court's determination. Consequently, the writer has
made an analysis of the decisions to determine what specific acts
have been deemed cruelty by the court. To facilitate discussion,
the conduct involved is categorized into physical or mental
cruelty.
Physical Cruelty
In nearly all of the cases involving any kind of unprovoked
physical attack, separation has been awarded to the complain-
ant.10 Where this type of conduct appears in repeated and un-
5. Id. at 1007, 41 So. at 2.39.
6. Artigues v. Artigues, 172 La. 884, 135 So. 665 (1931). For facts of this
case, see page 539 infra.
7. See Schneider v. Schneider, 214 La. 759, 38 So.2d 732 (1949) ; Kammer v.
Reed, 176 La. 1091, 147 So. 357 (1933) ; Veal v. Veal, 140 La. 879, 74 So. 181
(1917) ; Harrison v. Harrison, 115 La. 817, 40 So. 232 (1906).
8. Veal v. Veal, 140 La. 879, 74 So. 181. (1917) ; Cooper v. Cooper, 10 La. 249
(1836).
9. See Temperance v. l-Jerrmann, 191 La. 696, 186 So. 73 (1938) ; Gormley v.
Gormley, 161 La. 121, 108 So. 307 (1926); Trowbridge v. Carlen, 12 La. Ann.
882 (1857).
10. Guillory v. Dupuy, 195 La. 585, 197 So. 240 (1940) (in addition to several
prior quarrels, the husband struck his wife several times, knocking her to the floor,
causing severe pain and injury; and threatened to kill her with a rifle) ; Talbert
v. Talbert, 192 La. 837, 189 So. 448 (1939) (besides previous acts of kicking his
wife and throwing a drink in her face, a quarrel over the husband's allowing a
woman to be in their home alone with him during his wife's absence resulted in
his becoming angry, threatening his wife, cursing her, and grabbing her viciously
by the neck); Duckworth v. Duckworth, 179 La. 777, 155 So. 21 (1934) (the
husband struck and cursed his wife, pulled her hair, and refused to pay a doctor
bill incurred by her) ; Simpkins v. Simpkins, 168 La. 632, 122 So. 888 (1929)
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bearable instances, the court has no difficulty in finding that the
marriage is insupportable.
Physical violence cases requiring more scrutiny than the type
mentioned above are those which involve only a single instance
that disturbs marital peace. In the early case of Fleytas v.
Pigneguy"l the court held that one act of ill treatment during a
long cohabitation does not justify a separation when there is no
apparent reason for the cruelty and when it is unattended by
aggravating circumstances. The case was followed and a separa-
tion denied in Primeaux v. Comeaux,12 in which the wife struck
her husband with a poker, and in the ensuing scuffle, he slapped
her lightly. Subsequently, however, in Veal v. Veal, 3 one in-
stance of misbehavior was held sufficient. 4 In that case as a
result of an argument, the husband cursed the wife, accused her
of unfaithfulness, and grabbed her by the throat and threw her
down. The court distinguished both the Fleytas and Primeaux
cases on the ground that in those cases the cruelty was provoked
by the complainant's own fault and that there were other quali-
fying circumstances. Nevertheless, the status of the Veal case
as authority is somewhat in doubt. For in a later decision,
(the husband kicked, struck, and grossly abused his wife, and drove her to her
father's house, saying he would not return) ; Pinchon v. Pinchon, 164 La. 272, 113
So. 845 (1927) (the husband was proved to have come home drunk on several
occasions, at which times he struck and abused his wife to a considerable extent) ;
Fertel v. Weinberg, 161 La. 955, 109 So. 775 (1926) (the preponderance of the
evidence revealed that the husband cursed, struck, and kicked the wife without
cause) ; Kemp v. Kemp, 144 La. 671, 81 So. 221 (1918) (the husband continually
sided with his children in arguments with the plaintiff, his second wife, humil-
iated her in front of them, and finally in a fit of anger, slapped her and pulled
her hair).
11. 9 La. 419 (1836). The defendant was alleged to have struck his wife once,
but no evidence as to the origin of the fight was presented. The evidence further
brought out the fact that the plaintiff had a violent temper and there was a pos-
sibility that she provoked the blow. The denial of the decree seems to be due more
to the lack of evidence than anything else.
12. 139 La. 549, 71 So. 845 (1916).
13. 140 La. 879, 74 So. 181 (1917). The facts were exceptionally strong here.
The defendant evidenced his bad humor on the night in question by several curse
words directed toward his wife. Being afraid to remain at home alone with him,
she told him she was going out to see some friends. He accused her of going out
with some man, and when she went to her room, he followed, cursing her and then
threatening to end it all, grabbed her and threw her down. He was pulled off by
a friend of the wife and after being locked out of the room, tried to re-enter in a
violent manner.
14. For other cases holding one act sufficient, see DeJean v. Debose, 226 La.
600, 76 So.2d 900 (19.54) (there had actually been many violent instances, but
all except the last had been condoned by a reconciliation) ; DeJoie v. DeJoie, 224
La. 611, 70 So.2d 398 (1954) (for facts see page 540 infra) ; Schneider v. Schnei-
der, 214 La. 759, 38 So.2d 732 (1949) (for facts see page 541 infra) ; Sliman v.
Sliman, 155 La. 397, 99 So. 343 (1924) (for facts see page 537 infra).
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Romero v. Dautrielle,15 the court in its majority opinion ignored
the Veal case and cited the Primeaux case as authority for the
proposition: "A solitary instance of ill treatment . . .will not
warrant a judgment of separation from bed and board." '16 While
concurring in the decree, Chief Justice O'Niell disagreed with
the above quotation of the court and, in the writer's opinion,
accurately pointed out that the Veal case had considered the ques-
tion and had determined that the Primeaux case was not author-
ity for the doctrine that one instance can never be sufficient.
It is understandable that the conduct involved in the Veal
case could render living together insupportable, especially since
the wife was found to be a lady of culture and refinement. It is
also justifiable that a severe beating would change the relation-
ship between the spouses to such a degree that life together
would be equally insupportable. Thus, in a case involving a sin-
gle instance where the husband cursed, abused, and severely
assaulted and beat his wife during an argument over her recent
expenditures, the separation was granted.1 7 Similarly, where a
wife struck her husband with a club while he lay in bed, the
court granted separation.' An adequate statement of the present
rule is that a single act of ill treatment against a spouse who is
not free from fault, during a long cohabitation, does not author-
ize a judgment of separation from bed and board. 19 If there is
no fault on the part of the complainant, however, one instance
may be enough.
Logically, the more incidents and aggravations that are
chargeable to a spouse, the easier are the chances of finding that
life together is insupportable. When, however, several com-
plaints are referred to in the court's opinion as the basis for ren-
dering the decree, it becomes impossible to determine which acts
were given the most consideration by the court. In many cases
one of the acts alone may have been sufficient, while in many
other cases no one or two deeds by themselves could have been
enough, and the decisions must have been based on the accumu-
lated grievances. For example, one case involved a wife's inter-
ference with the husband as he was choking their son.2 0 The
15. 163 La. 597, 112 So. 498 (1927).
16. Id. at 599, 112 So. at 499.
17. Sliman v. Sliman, 155 La. 397, 99 So. 343 (1924).
18. Toney v. Toney, 170 La. 1033, 129 So. 627 (1930).
19. Weiser v. Weiser, 168 La. 847, 123 So. 595 (1929) (for facts of this case
see page 5.39 infra).
20. Millet v. Millet, 144 La. 921, 81 So. 400 (1919).
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husband threw her with such force against the wall that her
shoulder was dislocated. When it was shown that during her sub-
sequent illness, he lived in the next room, locked the door, ate
out, and never went in to see his wife or minister to her needs,
the court called it "cruel treatment in the extreme."'2 1 In another
case the following series of occurrences led to a decree of sep-
aration.2 2 The husband refused to feed his wife and also refused
to let her in the house when she returned from her father's
house, where she was forced to eat. He also neglected to give her
medicine, broke furniture, cursed her, and struck her twice. In
this case life together was unquestionably insupportable. The
court in another case2 . found that threats by the husband, "some-
thing closely resembling choking," exasperating charges of lazi-
ness, unreasonable denial of his wife's use of the night lamp, and
brutal monopolizing of the bed by requiring her to sleep on the
floor, were sufficient irritations to render living together insup-
portable. In one case the husband repeatedly ordered his wife
out of the house and then enticed her to return only to have the
same thing happen again. In addition, on at least one occasion,
he "laid rough hands on her, not to her maiming or serious in-
jury, but decidedly less gently than a man should ever lay hands
on a woman, especially his wife and the mother of his children."
The court felt this was sufficient to warrant a judgment of sep-
aration. 24 The facts of another case 25 so clearly evidenced cruelty
that even admitting alleged misconduct of the wife (not speci-
fied), she was granted a separation. The husband's many acts
included cursing, refusal to provide living expenses, staying
away from home on several occasions without any explanation, a
vicious attempt to drag his wife outside in her nightgown, and
ordering her out of his house. In all these cases, it is virtually
impossible to develop any rules or concrete statements of the
court to apply to future cases other than to indicate the sort of
actions which, when cumulated, are tantamount to physical
cruelty sufficient to warrant separation.
Thus far, an examination has been made only of cases in-
volving physical cruelty in which separation has been granted.
Note must be taken as well of the decisions involving the cruelty
question in which the separation decree requested has been
21. Id. at 923, 81 So. at 401.
22. Moclair v. Leahy, 36 la. Ann. 583 (1884).
23. McCarty v. Stelly, 145 La. 456, 82 So. 411 (1919).
24. Fitzgerald v. Silva, 175 La. 414, 415, 143 So. 359, 360 (1932).
25. Hammonds v. Caballero, 207 La. 1090, 22 So.2d 660 (1945).
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denied for varying reasons. As previously stated, the early posi-
tion taken by the court that a single instance of ill treatment
would not warrant a judgment for separation was clarified in
Veal v. Veal, although its status has been doubtful as a result of
a later case.2" Also, where the grievance was provoked by the
complaining spouse, separation has been denied.27 For example,
in one case, where a wife received a bruised eye as a result of a
quarrel with her husband for his being too slow in running an
errand, the court denied the wife's demand for separation, since
she instigated the quarrel.28 In another case the wife struck the
husband with a vase, but the husband had started the fray by a
blow with his hand, and his demand for separation was denied.29
In a third case the fact that the husband was present and par-
ticipated in a drinking party at which the wife had too many
drinks prevented him from obtaining a separation on those
grounds. 30
Along the same lines, an interesting decision is Artigues v.
Artigues.31 There, a young husband admitted slapping his wife
with his hand on several occasions. The court held that since
the spouses were childish, impetuous, and high tempered, and it
was shown that they often quarreled and that the husband would
grab and spank his wife and would be thereafter forgiven, the
slapping was not altogether uncondoned and not sufficient for
a separation. In a somewhat different case, the husband used
deceit and physical force in a good faith attempt to commit his
wife to a mental institution. The court held the conduct permis-
sible under the circumstances and denied separation.3 2 Although
the facts are diverse, all of these cases seem to demonstrate that
where the physical violence is provoked, condoned, or justified,
26. Romero v. Dautrielle, 163 La. 597, 112 So. 498 (1927); see page 537
supra.
27. Silva v. Miramon, 156 La. 360, 100 So. 528 (1924) (the court reasoned
that after the husband gave the wife just ground for believing that he had aban-
doned her, he cannot complain that she should voice her indignation, even to the
extent of scratching his face) ; Cooper v. Cooper, 10 La. 249 (1836) (frequent
quarrels and abuse by both parties were climaxed by the husband's pushing his
wife out of the door, the action being provoked by an insinuation by the wife that
he was not a gentleman).
28. Weiser v. Weiser, 168 La. 847, 123 So. 595 (1929).
29. Biri v. Biri, 175 La. 229, 143 So. 57 (1932).
30. Broderick v. Broderick, 191 La. 492, 186 So. 5 (1938).
31. 172 La. 884, 135 So. 665 (1931).
32. Kalpakis v. Kalpakis, 221 La. 739, 60 So.2d 217 (1952) (the acts of
deceit and physical force were not specified).
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the Supreme Court feels a request for separation should be
denied.
Mental Cruelty
In addition to acts of physical mistreatment, behavior caus-
ing purely mental anguish may be cruelty of such a nature as to
render living together insupportable. In Olberding v. Gohres the
court stated: "A husband may be guilty of outrages [against his
wife] . . . such as to render their living together insupportable,
without raising his hand against her. His conduct may be the
very refinement of cruelty, without either force or blows." 33 To
illustrate, in one case, where a husband separated his wife from
her four eldest sons by ordering her away and insulted her in
the presence of the children whenever he encountered her in
public places, the court said that this was "cruelty in the sense
of the Civil Code" and living together was insupportable.34 Sim-
ilarly, when a wife fired a shot at her husband to "frighten him"
into being more sympathetic, he being unaware of her motive,
the court held that to live in a house in fear of bodily harm is
such cruel treatment as to render living together insupportable."
Particular acts of mental cruelty must be alleged, however, as
mere "want of congeniality" will not suffice.80
In the writer's view, the factual elements of the cases in-
volving mental cruelty lend themselves to the following classifi-
cation: (a) abusive and violent language and excessive quarrel-
ing, (b) indifference and neglect, (c) false accusations not con-
stituting defamation, (d) refusal to provide a separate home,
(e) cruelty to the children, (f) expulsion from the home, (g)
loathsome disease unknown to the other spouse, (h) miscellane-
ous grounds, and (i) accumulation of grievances.
(a) Abusive and violent language and excessive quarreling.
To allow a separation merely for violent or abusive language
would seem to require very strong facts or else some extraneous
cause to justify the decree. In Smith v. Smith87 the court felt
that the use of vile epithets by one party did not warrant separa-
tion when the parties were "ending life's course." It stated:
33. Olberding v. Gohres, 107 La. 715, 717, 31 So. 1028, 1029 (1902) (for facts
of this case see page 544 infra).
34. Williams v. Varnado, 117 La. 905, 42 So. 419 (1906).
35. DeJoie v. DeJoie, 224 La. 611, 70 So.2d 398 (1954).
36. Ogden v. Hebert, 49 La. Ann. 1714, 22 So. 919 (1897).
37. 116 La. 1005, 41 So. 238 (1906).
(Vol. XVI
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"Should we grant a separation of property, it may be followed
by divorce, which would sever the ties of matrimony which
should never be severed except for manifest legal cause." 38 In
Kammer v. Reed,3 9 however, when speaking of the husband's use
of a highly objectionable name on various occasions toward his
wife and child, the court said: "We are fully justified . . . in
maintaining the self respect and.., the womanhood of the plain-
tiff, a lady of refinement, against such vile epithets, insults, and
outrages .... IT] he ill treatment ... received . . . is of such a
nature as to render living together insupportable. '40 In the more
recent case of Schneider v. Schneider,4 in which the court cited
the Kammer case, a separation was granted where only one inci-
dent was involved, during which the wife and the seventeen-year
old daughter were violently cursed, insulted, and threatened for
several hours.42 The facts in that case were particularly aggra-
vated, but nevertheless the case reflects a possible liberalization
of the concept of insupportability provided by the Code and ex-
pressed in the Smith case, although in the latter case the court
gave great weight to the length of the marriage. For in the
Schneider case, the living together was rendered insupportable
in a few short hours by insults and threats, a type of offensive
conduct which might be considered the least objectionable. Such
cases involving vile epithets and other acts of mental cruelty re-
quire the utmost careful consideration by the court, because the
careless award of a separation in a case where the facts are not
strong may create an extremely lenient rule which would lead
to unwarranted extensions of the concepts of insupportability.
Whether quarrelling, unattended by predominantly abusive
violent language, will render living together insupportable re-
mains an unsettled question. The only case discovered relating
38. Id. at 1007, 41 So. at 239.
39. 176 La. 1091, 147 So. 357 (1933).
40. Id. at 1096, 147 So. at 358. The fact that the husband continually refused
to speak to his wife for four or five days at a time was also a factor.
41. 214 La. 759, 38 So.2d 732 (1949).
42. Ibid. The court said in granting the separation that this incident was no
mild dispute because, first, the plaintiff sought the aid of both her and defendant's
brother; second, defendant's sister came to talk to him; third, the daughter dis-
played a butcher knife in defense of the plaintiff; and, fourth, in a mild dispute
in a family of culture and refinement, one does not ordinarily use such vile epi-
thets, especially before a seventeen-year old child. But see Dunn v. Eiche, 175
La. 801, 144 So. 501 (1932) (the court considered it "good advice" when the
husband told his wife in front of a hired servant that she would be a "damned
fool" if she would not keep out of certain other persons' affairs.
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to this problem is Schlater v. LeBlanc, 43 decided in 1908, in which
the court found that repeated quarrels, resulting in "uncon-
trolled irritation and violent displays of temper" are sufficient
to constitute mental cruelty. The facts of the case indicate that
the quarrelling had become extreme and that the granting of sep-
aration was justified. Whether or not the court would grant a
separation under less severe circumstances is not apparent, but
occasional quarrels alone should never be sufficient to justify a
separation.
(b) Indifference and neglect. One spouse's refusal to live
with the other may be abandonment but not cruel treatment.44
In one case, however, the husband intentionally neglected his
wife in favor of several other women. He became very matter
of fact about the associations, even admitting that he had con-
tracted a venereal disease from one of his companions. The court
said that because of the worry and suffering caused the wife by
the husband's behavior, she should not be forced to live with
him.45 The living together in that case was truly insupportable.
Indifference expressed by one spouse's telling the other that he
or she no longer loves the other was discussed in Spansenberg v.
Carter,4 ' an abandonment case. The court stated, in finding that
there was just cause for abandonment, that for a wife to tell
her husband that she had ceased to love him, deliberately and
not in a state of temper, is cruel treatment.47 On the other hand,
in the later case of Ducros v. Ducros,4 a declaration by the de-
fendant to his wife that he no longer loved her was held not to
be cruelty such as to render living together insupportable. The
effect of the case is to restrict the holding of the Spansenberg
decision to situations involving abandonment and not actions for
separation on the ground of cruelty. This seems to be borne out
by Parish v. Parish,49 which expressly followed the Ducros de-
cision. There the wife stated to her husband that she no longer
cared for him and the court held that, while this was certainly
43. 121 La. 919, 46 So. 921 (1908). The court stated such repeated quarrels
were cruelty, disturbance of the wife's peace of mind, aggravation of a nervous
condition, and destruction of the legitimate object of matrimony.
44. Sampagnaro v. Sampagnora, 211 La. 105, 29 So.2d 581 (1947).
45. Lester v. Lester, 160 La. 708, 107 So. 499 (1926).
46. 151 La. 1038, 92 So. 673 (1922).
47. Ibid. The court even went so far as to call this "the end of connubial
felicity, to the marriage relation, to the home itself. Therefore living under the
same roof with a person whose affection has permanently ended is necessarily in-
supportable." Id. at 1049, 92 So. at 677.
48. 156 La. 1033, 101 So. 407 (1924).
49. 164 La. 62, 113 So. 764 (1927).
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cruel, it did not constitute cruelty within the meaning of article
138(3). Thus, it would seem, as reflected in the Ducros and
Parish decisions, the court's attitude as to this subject has
changed from the opinions expressed in the Spansenberg case,
and the latter case should not be considered applicable to situa-
tions involving cruelty.
In addition to romantic indifference, estrangement of af-
fection is a factor which has been considered. In one case, the
husband became unexplainably estranged in his affections and
neglected his wife, resulting in various insults directed at her
and in disobedience by their children. The court held that mar-
ried persons cannot be divorced for just any kind of reason, and
that "estrangement of affections and the coldness and indiffer-
ence which grow on changeful man are not good reasons for
divorce."'
Mere nonsupport of one's family has been held not to be
cruelty. 51 Thus, where a husband failed to speak to his family
and to give his wife enough money to support and clothe herself
and her child in a manner commensurate with his income and
her economic station in life, such was held insufficient to support
a decree of separation. The court remarked that failure to take
care of a wife and child is a "dereliction of duty" but not legal
cause for separation.52 In another decision it was held that the
complaint that the defendant "did not try to take care of his
wife and child" did not constitute in that case, if in any, suffi-
cient ill treatment to warrant interference by the court.5 3
In only one instance has neglect of any kind resulted in a
separation decree. 5 4 In that case the husband neglected to pro-
vide medical care for his wife who had become ill while working
in the fields. In cases involving denial of accustomed social
life,55 or denial of "necessaries" according to the style which
suited some of the wife's wealthy friends, or failure to pay
50. Tourn6 v. Tourn6, 9 La. 452, 454 (1836). It went further to say that "a
series of studied vexations and provocations on the part of a husband, without ever
resorting to personal violence" may be cruelty, but felt, in denying the separation,
that the unkind insults made by the children to the plaintiff in this case were
caused more by the husband's weakness than by cruelty on his part. Id. at 456.
51. Thompson v. Emery, 127 La. 718, 53 So. 968 (1911).
52. Keir v. Digby, 166 La. 92, 116 So. 711 (1928).
53. Halls v. Cartwright, 18 La. Ann. 414 (1866).
54. Dollar v. Dollar, 159 La. 219, 105 So. 296 (1925) (the wife had been ill
since the birth of her last child and it was only at the insistence of her husband
that she worked in the first place).
55. Ducros v. Ducros, 156 La. 1033, 101 So. 407 (1924).
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promptly their child's educational expenses,5 the court prop-
erly refused to allow a separation.-
(c) False accusations not constituting defamation.57 This
category is illustrated by the Hansborough case.5 There, over a
period of two years, a husband sent his wife, his children, and
his stepson a series of letters containing complaints, insults, and
accusations of infidelity designed to destroy his wife's peace of
mind and happiness and bring about a divorce. The court cor-
rectly held this to be cruel treatment sufficient to render the
marriage insupportable. In another case the husband, in addi-
tion to ordering his wife to leave his house and then taking her
to her father, threatened to tell her father of certain purely
imaginary acts of infidelity and then accused her of these acts,
using the names of her alleged paramours. The court held the
conduct to be cruel and outrageous.5 9 Although the series of acts
involved in the case may indeed have rendered living together
insupportable, the accusations considered alone would seem in
the writer's opinion to fall short of the insupportability require-
ment. However, in two other cases accusations alone have been
held sufficient. In the first case, a husband told his wife in front
of her relatives that she was guilty of an infamous crime.60 In
the other case the husband charged his wife, in her sister's pres-
ence, with an atrocious crime and with being the mistress of
another man. The court held in both cases that the accusations
did not amount to defamation, but they did constitute cruel treat-
mnt under article 138.01 It is submitted that although such
accusations were unkind and reprehensible, they should not be
considered sufficient in themselves to render living together
insupportable, especially since they were made on merely one
occasion and then only in front of a member of the accused
party's family.
(d) Refusal to provide a separate home. Refusal by a spouse
to provide a separate home away from relatives, following dis-
56. Rowley v. Rowley, 19 La. 557 (1841) ; see Armentor v. Gondron, 184 La.
922, 168 So. 102 (1936) (husband's refusal to participate in the wife's desired
social activity was held justified on the ground that it would interfere with the
husband's business).
57. Public defamation is a separate ground for separation. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 138(4) (1870).
58. Hansbrough v. Hansbrough, 153 La. 445, 96 So. 27 (1923).
59. Champagne v. Duplantis, 147 La. 110, 84 So. 513 (1920).
60. Olberding v. Gohres, 107 La. 715, 31 So. 1028 (1902) (the court in grant-
ing the decree failed to term the act "cruelty").
61. Vicknair v. Terracino, 164 La. 117, 113 So. 787 (1927).
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agreements between the other spouse and his family has caused
several actions for separation. Where the husband refused to
establish a separate domicile away from his parents who were
cruel to his wife and refused to allow her to care for her child,
the court, although not calling the action "cruelty," granted a
separation. 62 Another couple, after a separation, reconciled and
agreed to live away from the husband's sisters. Thereafter the
husband took the children and went back to his sisters, with
whom he remained, refusing to let his wife see the children and
insulting her in front of them.6 The court reversed and re-
manded a judgment refusing to grant the decree. In another case
a husband's refusal to provide a home away from his mother who
had become hostile and abusive was deemed to be cruel treat-
ment.6 4 Likewise, where a husband's relatives living with the
couple cursed, abused, and generally mistreated the wife, the
court found that the husband was able to provide another home
and thus declared the failure to do so sufficient cause for sep-
aration.65 On the other hand, refusal to live separately from the
husband's family is not grounds for separation when earnings
are not sufficient to maintain a separate home and the parents-
in-law are kind to the wife.66
(e) Cruelty to the children. The court has been faced with
this question in three cases. In one, a father shot his son in the
mother's presence and refused to allow her to go to the dying
boy's aid, threatening that she would be killed if she moved.67
No more extreme example of the insupportability of marriage
after that incident can be imagined. In another, the court stated
that mere punishment of a child is not grounds for separation,
but where done solely to cause the other spouse grief, resulting
in ill health, it is cruelty of such a nature as to warrant legal
separation. 68 But, according to the third decision, where the
punishment inflicted on the children is not designed to give the
other spouse grief, no separation will be granted. 69
(f) Expulsion from the home. An act such as expulsion of
the spouse from the home should certainly constitute cruelty,
62. Delsa v. Raymond, 126 La. 126, 52 So. 240 (1910).
63. Meunier v. Thibodaux, 136 La. 655, 67 So. 540 (1915).
64. Cormier v. Cormier, 193 La. 158, 190 So. 365 (1939).
65. Bonvillion v. Papa, 218 La. 203, 48 So.2d 897 (1950).
66. Artigues v. Artigues, 172 La. 884, 135 So. 665 (1931).
67. Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, 179 La. 112, 153 So. 531 (1934).
68. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 49 La. Ann. 1696, 22 So. 929 (1897).
69. Romero v. Dautrielle, 163 La. 597, 112 So. 498 (1927).
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and it has been so held. Thus, a defendant's action in ordering
his wife out of the house on several occasions, spitting at her
once, and charging her with being worthless was held to consti-
tute cruel and humiliating conduct, making marriage insup-
portable. 0 In a similar case the husband turned his wife out-
doors and forbade her to return until he sent for her, else he
would drive her away with his "cowhide."'" The court here, in-
fluenced by the age, habits, and mode of life of the parties,72
coupled with the repentance of the husband and his willingness
to live with her, refused to grant a separation. It is easy to see
that the last case, though similar to the first, had several dif-
ferences which enabled the court to deny a separation.
(g) Loathsome disease unknown to other spouse. Two adju-
dicated cases come within this category. In one, a man com-
municated a venereal disease to his wife who was unaware that
he was infected. 7 Evidence showed that before the marriage he
had been treated for the disease and knew or should have known
that there was danger of his wife's contracting it. This com-
plete indifference to his wife's health was sufficient to warrant
a separation on the ground of cruelty, as it certainly must have
rendered the marriage insupportable. But where a husband con-
cealed that he was a leper until he was incarcerated at the sani-
tarium, the court refused to grant a separation, since the wife
was neither infected nor in any danger of being so. 4 The court
said that "humiliation and mortification which result from de-
ception, and conduct not amounting to an outrage, but which
merely wounds the mental feelings" is not cruelty.7 5
(h) Miscellaneous grounds. Falling into this classification
are several cases. In one, it was held that the husband's action
in spreading a rumor that his wife was insane and telling at
least four persons of the couple's unhappy home life was suffi-
cient to support a separation decree on the ground of cruel treat-
ment, though not on the basis of defamation. 76 The decision was
based partly on the prominent social class of the couple, the court
70. Schoras v. Staba, 150 La. 674, 91 So. 148 (1922).
71. Lauber v. Mast, 15 La. Ann. 593 (1860).
72. Ibid. The specific facts about these factors were not stated, the court
merely saying that in view of several leading cases, they were unable to hold that
the district court erred.
73. Carbajal v. Fernandez, 130 La. 812, 58 So. 581 (1912).
74. DeFranco v. Gagliano, 174 La. 1093, 142 So. 699 (1932).
75. Id. at 1097, 142 So. at 700.
76. Harrison v. Harrison, 115 La. 817, 40 So. 232 (1906).
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saying: "The higher we rise in the social scale, the more jealous-
ly guarded we find, is the secret of unhappiness of families." 77
There is a mutual obligation between spouses to submit to the
normal sexual desires of the other, and force used in "normal
desires" is not cruelty.78 What is "normal" seems to depend on
the various social and health factors concerning the couple. 79
(i) Accumulation of grievances. By "accumulation of griev-
ances" is meant all of the circumstances which have been consid-
ered collectively in judging a particular case. In an early case
the court granted a separation where twelve months of neglect
by the husband of his wife, in addition to indifference to her
affection, were followed by recurring scenes of violent quarrels
involving his use of opprobrious epithets.8 0 Although the court
in another case8l conceded that failure to support, per se, is not
a legal ground for separation (the husband had been guilty of
failure to provide proper food and clothing), it found that the
husband had a quarrelsome disposition, a dictatorial manner in
handling funds, and a highly nervous and irritable nature.
Furthermore, he had threatened to inflict personal violence on
his wife and had cursed and abused her. These combined griev-
ances had caused her to fear her husband and had rendered liv-
ing together insupportable. Somewhat similar is a case where
the husband came home intoxicated, cursed his wife, declared he
no longer loved her, and picked up a loaded weapon in such a
manner as to cause her to fear for her life and take refuge in a
neighbor's house.8 2 He was also proved guilty of threatening,
striking, cursing her on prior occasions, and of taking their child
away in his automobile for hours while he was under the influ-
ence of alcohol without telling his wife of his intentions. The
combination of circumstances in this case was considered suffi-
cient to render living together insupportable. The cumulative
77. Id. at 824, 40 So. at 234.
78. Mudd v. Mudd, 206 La. 1055, 20 So.2d 311 (1944).
79. Ibid. The court found that sexual intercourse once a day, with occasional
indulgences of twice or three times a day for this healthy, uneducated Negro
couple was reasonable and normal.
80. Terrell v. Boarman, 34 La. Ann. 301 (1882). The court recognized the
necessity of considering the character, habits, and education of the parties to
determine if the conduct renders living together insupportable, and finding that
the plaintiff was a lady of culture and refinement, granted a separation.
81. Allen v. Allen, 170 La. 100, 127 So. 378 (1930) (one particular instance
in which the husband became infuriated and threatened to kill his wife if she
did not leave his sight, impressed the court as to the hopelessness of the mar-
riage).
82. Balfe v. Balfe, 165 La. 283, 115 So. 489 (1928).
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effect of the wife's misconduct was decisive in another instance,
where it appeared she habitually gambled and spent beyond the
couple's means, and as a result neglected her household duties,
quarrelled, nagged, and abused her husband and interfered with
his medical practice. The court said that gambling habits, which
caused embarrassment or humiliation alone were not enough, but
where carried to excess and resulted in such as the above, they
constituted cruelty.8 In another case a man made unreason-
able demands and used brutal force in sexual relations while the
wife was pregnant, constantly criticized his wife in handling
family funds and in performance of household duties, and at-
tempted to take his wife to a tourist court against her will."'
This conduct resulted in the wife's experiencing repeated hys-
terical spells, she being a person of highly nervous tempera-
ment. The court's grant of separation appears justified.
The element of faithlessness was a factor in a decision con-
cerning collective grievances.55 The husband, it seems, over a
period of seven years had openly devoted much attention to
another woman, disregarding the pleas of his wife to cease such
conduct. One day he and the other woman were confronted by
his wife on a main street in New Orleans, whereupon he insulted
his wife and used vile language. The court said this series of ac-
tions, climaxed by the verbal insults, was cruelty sufficient to
render living together insupportable, because it constantly hu-
miliated the wife and deprived her of a happy home and of
being accepted in society. Another peculiar situation developed
in two cases involving the same set of circumstances.8 0 The de-
fendant husband became obsessed with his new religious ideas
and neglected his wife, children, and business, and attempted
to convert the children to his new faith. He became very strict
with his wife and forbade her to take part in any of her ac-
customed social activities, causing her humiliation and grief.
In addition, he accused her of leading an empty life and of being
83. Moore v. Moore, 192 La. 289, 187 So. 670 (1939).
84. Wendling v. Aucoin, 214 La. 361, 37 So.2d 819 (1948) ; but see Thompson
v. Emery, 127 La. 718, 53 So. 968 (1911) (separation was denied on the ground
that nonsupport, pawning the wife's piano, and failure to pay his debts were not
cruelty).
85. Holmes v. Holmes, 50 La. Ann. (N.R.S. ed.) 768, 771, 23 So. 324, 326
(1898) (an argument arose at the street meeting and the husband told his female
companion to take his cane and "give her [his wife] hell, and knock her damn
brains out").
86. Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La. 218, 111 So. 683 (1927) ; Trautman v. Krauss,
159 La. 371, 105 So. 376 (1925).
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unfit to raise their child. The court recognized that the change
of religion and attempts to convert his children were not enough
alone to support a judgment of separation, but with the accusa-
tions and resulting humiliation, it found the action amounted
to cruelty.s 7 Although, as in the physical violence cases involving
several grievances, it would be difficult to evolve any definite
standards to serve as means of predicting future decisions, it
may nevertheless be useful to note that the court has had no
difficulty in finding that accumulated acts of mental cruelty
render the marriage insupportable.
Conclusion
The cases which have been discussed illustrate that cruelty
of such a nature as to render living together insupportable may
be found in a great variety of circumstances. Several conclu-
sions may be drawn from this analysis. One isolated act can be
sufficient. It is not necessary that the act or acts inflict physical
injury; mental harassment alone may suffice. The act of cruelty
need not be directly committed against the other spouse, but
may be inflicted on their child to cause grief to the other. The
married life as a whole, including its social, economic, and
psychological aspects, is considered in evaluating the particular
acts complained of. The concept of insupportability has prop-
erly been interpreted to include situations in which cruelty has
caused such danger to or animosity toward the other spouse as
to result in great fear88 or an absolute breakdown of harmonious
relations. In cases involving abusive language, expulsion from
the home and false accusations, however, the court has been
inclined to give the requirement of insupportability a more
lenient interpretation. 9 With these exceptions, the standard of
insupportability has very nearly conformed to the definition
preliminarily suggested by the writer. It may be noted that
87. Krauss v. Krauss, 163 La. 218, 111 So. 683 (1927) (the trial court ren-
dered a decision granting a separation, and in affirming the judgment, the Su-
preme Court concluded that conduct producing "perpetual social sorrow" is
cruelty). Id. at 226, 111 So. at 686.
88. Thompson v. Emery, 127 La. 718, 53 So. 968 (1911). The court held that
if the husband's paroxysms of rage were such cruelty as to cause his wife to
fear for her life and render living together insupportable, separation would be
granted. This statement implies that if the wife were made to fear for her life,
living together would be insupportable.
89. See Schneider v. Schneider. 214 La. 759, 38 So.2d 732 (1949) (facts
on page 541 supra); Vicknair v. Terracino, 164 La. 117, 113 So. 787 (1927)
(facts on page 544 supra); Schoras v. Staba, 150 La. 674, 91 So. 148 (1922)
(facts on page 546 supra) ; Olberding v. Gohres, 107 La. 715, 31 So. 1028 (1902)
(facts on page 544 supra).
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there have been no cases decided on the ground of cruelty which
should have been based on other grounds. The court's early posi-
tion with regard to the sanctity of marriage 0 undoubtedly has
been changed over the years, but the modifications of policy
have not been apparent in the cases involving complaints of
cruelty. Unless the trend toward consent divorce as illustrated
by the law authorizing divorce on the sole ground of separation
in fact is reversed, the ground of cruelty will continue to be of
diminishing importance.
James F. Pierson, Jr.
The Delays for Filing Transcripts of Appeal and the
Duty To Do So in the Various Appellate Courts
of Louisiana
Considerable difficulty has been experienced by attorneys in
Louisiana in ascertaining the proper procedure for filing the
transcript of the trial record in the appropriate appellate court.
Much of this difficulty can be attributed to a lack of uniformity
in the prescribed methods for filing of transcripts that resulted
from statutory amendments which changed the procedure for
appeal on an individual appellate court basis rather than by
comprehensive provisions applicable to all appellate courts. The
purpose of this Comment is to discuss when there is a duty to
file, the time within which to file, and the results of late filing
of the record in the appellate courts of this state. In the determi-
nation of the proper procedure for filing the transcript, a close
analysis must be made of the various statutory provisions in the
light of the various appellate courts to which they apply.
Prior Procedure
Prior to act 106 of 1908 and act 22 of 1914, article 583 of the
Code of Practice provided that the appellee be cited to appear
before the appellate court "at its next term or return day for the
90. Dubon v. Dubon, 110 La. 240, 34 So. 428 (1903) ("the courts of Lou-
isiana are reluctant to interfere with the relations of man and wife and slow in
interposing their authority wherever it seems probable in any reasonable view
that those relations may be preserved"); Halls v. Cartwright, 18 La. Ann. 414
(1866) (the court held that public policy, good morals and the highest interests
of society require every safeguard to the marriage relation and a severance is
allowed only for causes specified by law and clearly proven).
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